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The unprecedented drop in international trade during the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 
2009  has  mostly  been  analysed  at  the  macroeconomic  or  sectoral  level.  However,  heterogeneous 
exporters in terms of productivity, size or external finance dependence should be hit differently by the 
crisis.  This issue is examined here using data on monthly exports at the product and destination level 
for  some  100,000  individual  French exporters, up  to  2009M4.  We show  that  the  drop  in  French 
exports is mainly due to the intensive margin of large exporters. Small and large firms are evenly 
affected when sectoral and geographical specialisations are controlled for. Lastly, firms (small and 
large) in sectors structurally more dependent on external finance are the most affected by the crisis. 
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La chute sans précédent du commerce international pendant le quatrième trimestre 2008 et le premier 
trimestre 2009 a été analysée au niveau macroéconomique ou sectoriel. Toutefois, des exportateurs qui 
sont hétérogènes en termes de productivité, de taille ou de dépendance à la finance externe devraient 
être  touchés  de  manière  différenciée.  Cette  question  est  analysée  dans  cet  article  en  utilisant  les 
données mensuelles d’exportations françaises désagrégées par produits et destinations, pour environ 
100.000 entreprises exportatrices jusqu’en avril 2009. Nous montrons que la chute des exportations 
françaises  est  due  principalement  à  la  marge  intensive  des  plus  gros  exportateurs.  Tous  les 
exportateurs, quelle que soit leur taille, sont cependant touchés de façon comparable quand on contrôle 
pour les effets liés aux spécialisations sectorielles et géographiques. Enfin, les entreprises, qu’elles 
soient grandes ou petites, appartenant aux secteurs qui sont structurellement les plus dépendants des 
financements externes, ont été les plus touchées par la crise. 
 
Mots clés : crise financière, commerce international, hétérogénéité des firmes, marges intensive et 
extensive 
Codes JEL : F02, F10, G01 
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1- Introduction 
Much attention has been paid to the unprecedented drop in international trade during the last quarter of 
2008 and the first quarter of 2009: according to Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) this drop in world 
exports  is  even  sharper  than  during  1929-1930.  Beyond  a  limited  resurgence  of  protectionism 
(Gamberoni and Newfarmer, 2009; Baldwin and Evenett, 2009, Bussiere et al., 2009), two broad 
explanations of this collapse of world trade have been suggested.   
First,  the  slump  in  trade  has  been  associated  with  a  sharp  deterioration  of  demand  and  activity 
worldwide,  deterioration  which  has  been  particularly  severe  in  the  rich  club  of  OECD  countries 
(Araujo and Oliveira-Martins, 2009) and for investment goods and the automobile industry (Francois 
and  Woerz,  2009). The  increasing  dominance  of  manufacturing  models  relying  on  internationally 
fragmented supply chains (Tanaka, 2009, Yi, 2009) may have magnified this impact of depressed 
activity on international trade. However, simulations which aim at identifying the contribution of the 
demand  channel  and  that  take  into  account  international  input-output  relationships  have  hardly 
reproduced the magnitude of the drop in world exports, suggesting that additional factors may have 
played a role (Benassy-Quéré et. al., 2009; Bussière et al., 2009; Willenbockel and Robinson, 2009).  
Secondly, the intensification of the financial crisis may have led to liquidity shortages and to higher 
risk aversion and negative confidence effects, both on the side of financial institutions as well as of 
producers. A more limited availability of trade credit and financing – instruments especially designed 
to  finance  import  and  export  activities  –  may  have  represented  a  key  determinant  of  the  global 
downturn (Auboin, 2009). This view is however challenged by Levchenko et al. (2009), in the case of 
US imports and exports. 
But more specifically, the micro-economic dimension of the current episode of trade collapse has not 
been addressed so far using consistent and exhaustive information on individual firms’ exports, to the 
best of our knowledge.
1 Using exhaustive data on the individual performance of exporters before and 
                                                            
1  The  exception  is  Bernard  et  al.  (2009)  investigating  the  impact  of  the  1997  financial  crisis  on 
individual US exporters. They find that the intensive margin had the main contribution to the decline 
in US exports. Still, they rely on annual data, while the development of the crisis would be better 
captured using infra-annual data. 4 
 
throughout the crisis will help us better understanding how and why trade has been so adversely 
affected by the economic downturn.  
We expect exporters which are heterogeneous in their performance and key characteristics within 
sectors to be heterogeneously affected by such a crisis.
2 The so-called New New Trade Theory with 
firm heterogeneity à la Melitz points to the importance of set-up (or beachhead) fixed costs which are 
often  sunk  on  top  of  exporting  variable  costs.
  3  Under  such  circumstances,  one  should  observe 
different adjustments of exporters to the crisis on the extensive and intensive margins. 
Against  this  background,  this  paper  aims  at  disentangling  the  contribution  of  various  sectoral, 
geographical and micro-economic determinants, including external finance dependence to the drop of 
French exports  during  the  crisis.  It  relies  on  monthly  data  for individual  French  exporters  at the 
product and destination level.
4 The choice of relying on all exporters rather that selecting only those 
for  which  information  on  individual  financial  constraints  is  available  (e.g.  in  balance  sheets)  is 
consistent with the ambition of estimating the relative contributions of the extensive and intensive 
margins to the collapse in French exports.  
Contrary to expectations, we firstly observe that the great bulk of the deterioration of exports appears 
to have originated from the intensive margin, i.e. by means of a reduction of exported volumes, rather 
than via the extensive margin.
5 For example, in February 2009, the intensive margin accounted for 
more  than  80%  of  the  total  27.5%  year-on-year  contraction  of  French  exports.  And  the  top  1% 
exporters, owing to their more global and continued presence on export markets, have been the most 
hardly hit. With a recorded loss of 16.4%, they absorbed more than 70% of the total loss in the 
intensive margin. Indeed, this crisis has posted a strong sectoral bias, with most of the contraction 
absorbed by exports in intermediate and other equipment goods and in the automotive industry. By 
                                                            
2 See Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) and Eaton et al. (2008), providing evidence for the French case of 
such heterogeneity. 
3 Sunk costs implied by export participation correspond to advertising, product adaptation to standards, 
gathering of information on regulations, R&D, the translation of the instructions for use, etc. Fixed 
costs correspond to the maintenance of a distribution network, etc. Variable costs correspond e.g. to 
transport costs. 
4 More precisely we consider exporters located in France, whatever the nationality of their ownership 
is. 
5 This result contrasts with the findings of Berman and Hericourt (2009) according to which access to 
external finance has a positive impact on the entry decision into the export market. 5 
 
contrast, losses for consumer goods have remained rather contained, relative to losses in volumes of 
exports  by  largest  1%  exporters.  After  controlling  for  export  orientation  in  terms  of  sectoral 
specialisation and destination markets served, large and small exporters have been similarly hit by the 
crisis. Similarly we find limited evidence of a differential impact of the crisis on firms with different 
degrees of export differentiation, i.e. between firms that focus on few products and markets only vs. 
firms that export many products to many destinations.  
Given the financial nature of the crisis and its strong sectoral component, we will further attempt to 
quantify the impact of credit constraints. Not all sectors are affected in the same way by financial 
constraints: the production technology, which tends to be sector specific, determines firms’ financial 
needs. The interaction between credit constraints and firm heterogeneity sharpens the firm selection 
effect:  the  churning  reallocating  market  shares  from  the  least  productive  to  the  most  productive 
exporters is higher than in normal circumstances (Manova, 2008). Small and less productive firms 
may be more affected by credit restrictions as a result of their size or lack of sufficient collateral or 
credit  guarantees  (Greenaway  et  al.,  2007;  Muûls,  2008).  Regarding  crisis  times,  Iacovone  and 
Zavacka (2009) disentangle the demand-side (import contraction affecting in particular durable goods) 
and supply-side (such as the lack of external finance) determinants of the drop in sectoral exports 
during a banking crisis. Still, both Manova (2008) and Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) address the trade 
margins at a rather aggregated level: respectively 27 sectors (comprising 4-digit SITC products) and 
38 (4-digit ISIC) sectors. 
Our investigation on the effect of financial constraints on the dynamics of French firms’ exports will 
make use of differences across sectors in their dependence on external finance, following the Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) methodology. We will calculate our indices of financial dependence based on a 
dataset  of  French  firms  included  in  our  data-sample  and  to  the  data-period  under  estimation. 
Considering the period from 2007M1 to 2009M4, the growth rates of exports will be regressed on the 
sectoral foreign demand on each market, on firms’ size or diversification, on a sectoral measure of 
financial  dependence,  plus  an  interaction  term  between  the  crisis  interacted  with  firms’  size  and 
financial dependence. 6 
 
We conclude that size ultimately did not matter in the recent trade crisis, but that the degree of sectoral 
external financial dependence matters, both in pre-crisis times and during the crisis. While firms in 
sectors extensively relying on external finance appear to have had a competitive advantage and export 
more than the average firm before the crisis, this advantage appears to have reversed during the recent 
turmoil. Belonging to a sector ranked in the top decile in terms of financial dependence is shown here 
to have a strong negative bias on the export performance in the period of the crisis, whatever the size 
of the exporter. It is worth stressing that our approach does not address the issue of export credit 
constraints  faced  by  individual  exporters.  We  do  not  rely  on  the  individual  exporters  financial 
constraints and we do not make use of export credit data. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the data. Section 2 provides detailed 
evidence on the evolution of firms’ exports during the crisis. Section 3 decomposes trade margins and 
section 4 addresses the impact of financial dependence on individual export performance. Section 5 




We rely on individual firms exports recorded on a monthly basis by the French customs. The period 
covered is 2000M1 to 2009M4. Two different thresholds apply for individual firms when it comes to 
the declaration of their exports. When exporting to a non-EU country, the threshold is 1,000 euros. 
When exporting to a Member state, the declaration is compulsory if the yearly cumulated value of 
exports to the other 26 EU Member states is larger than 150,000 euros. Using monthly data, it is 
unclear how this issue of threshold could be effectively tackled. Moreover we are interested in changes 
over time, and not in absolute figures. Hence we consider this issue of second order importance. We 
drop Chapters 99 (Commodities not elsewhere specified) and 98 (Commodities specified at chapter 
level only) as well as monetary gold, from the data. 
Each exporter is identified by its identification number (SIREN). This code allows to merge the data 
with the Amadeus database and thereby to match exports with financial information. 7 
 
In order to control for developments in global demand, we use monthly HS2 digit level sectoral data 
for 52 countries, as provided by the ITC (UNCTAD-WTO, Geneva). 
A first glance at the monthly French customs data (Figure 1) points to a steep decline in the value of 
total exports from September 2008 onwards. The number of French exporters, which has been on a 
decreasing trend since the year 2000, also appears to have further contracted in the crisis: from 50,458 
units in October 2008, to 46,616 units in April 2009. While seasonality and the number of working 
days may bias the results somewhat, all in all about 3,800 firms stopped exporting, corresponding to 7 
percent of the average number of monthly exporters over the whole ten year period considered. In 
conclusion, the comparison of data series relative to total exports values with the series on the number 
of exporters suggests that the bulk of the adjustment has been on the intensive rather than on the 
extensive margin. This is what our analysis will try to sort out. 
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
Each  exporter  ships  its  products  in  one  or  more  product  categories  defined  at  the  Combined 
Nomenclature 8 digits level (CN8) comprising some 10,000 different categories. Each category of 
product exported by a given firm can be shipped to more than one market. Accordingly, the most 
granular piece of information available in the French customs database is the value exported each 
month  by  a  French  resident  firm  in  a  CN8  category  to  each  destination  country.  From  a  simple 
statistical point of view, the resulting four-dimensional data point should be defined as an elementary 
flow. On average, 629,000 elementary flows were recorded monthly over the period from 2005M1 to 
2009M4.  
Changes in trade flows over time may originate from changes in any of the following: number of 
exporters, number of products, destination markets served and value shipped per each elementary 
flow. In our analysis, however, we will aggregate the product dimension of the data in sectors. Thus, 
our dependent variable will comprise export flows, where each data point corresponds to the value of 
exports of all exported products categorised under CN8 categories belonging to the same HS2 sector 
by each French exporter to each destination country. We accordingly cumulate all products exported 
within a sector at the firm level, by destination. Incidentally, a firm may appear several times in the 8 
 
database,  if  it  exports  CN8  products  belonging  to  more  than  one  HS2  sector.  This  choice  helps 
evaluating  results  on  account  that  the  current  crisis  appears  to  have  had  a  distinctive  sectoral 
dimension, as stylised facts from aggregate data suggest (effect strongest on durable goods, financial 
dependence of firms clearly following a sectoral dimension, etc.). 
 
2- Firm exports’ developments during the crisis by size class 
The first issue we address is whether large and small exporters have been affected differently by the 
crisis. Since our objective is to address the respective contributions of the intensive and extensive 
margins to the drop in French exports, we must keep the full sample of firms and thus work with 
export data only.  We will accordingly use the following two alternative methods to rank exporters. 
Firstly, we will rank firms, within their sectors, according to the total value of their exports relative to 
the exports of all other firms exporting in the same sector, in a given month.
6 Hence the monthly 
composition of the quantiles in a given sector actually varies. Note that an individual firm can export 
in more than one HS2 Chapter, and thus can belong to different quantiles in different sectors. Since 
one may however challenge the use of such ranking for calculating quantiles’ contributions to the 
observed changes in exports – the contribution of a given quantile is bounded by its overall weight – 
we also use a second method whereby the ranking is not determined by the size of exports. 
The second method of ranking is based on a criterion of diversification of exports at the individual 
firm level. We count the number of elementary flows by each firm (number of CN8 positions x 
destination markets in which exports are recorded at the firm level) and rank firms within quantiles 
accordingly. It is worth stressing here the underlying rationale of this alternative method of clustering 
firms in quantiles. Some very large French exporters in value are “champions”, exporting a single 
CN8 to a very limited number of markets each month, but realising huge export values per elementary 
flow.  Moreover, assuming  a  low  frequency  of  trade  relationships, the  destination  market  of  such 
                                                            
6  This  approach  does  not  consist  in  ranking  all  firms  having  exported  at  least  once  during  the 
preceding 12 months in a given sector, as opposed to the status of operator on a yearly basis used by 
the French customs. Note that any other definition of quantiles aiming at keeping their population 
constant  would  miss  at  least  the  entry  decisions.  Our  definition  is  consistent  with  the  choice  of 
performing an analysis of the whole universe of French exporters. 9 
 
exports  may  change  from  month  to  month.  In  such  a  scenario,  these  “champion-exporters”  are 
categorised in the top percentile in terms of exported value, but would be classified in the bottom of 
the distribution in terms of diversification, inflating the extensive margin of the respective groups. We 
can safely assume that such scenario well applies to sectors such as aeronautics, ship building, etc. At 
the other end of the range of possible scenarios, we can imagine that some over-productive firms are 
able to export to many destinations while still remaining relatively small in terms of total value of 
exports, for instance because they are (French) leaders but of a very small and specialised market. This 
alternative method, whose aim is to control for these extreme cases, will be used as a test of robustness 
of our results in Section 5.  
It is worth stressing that the extreme concentration of the losses among the top exporters made it worth 
categorising firms in four quantiles, using both criteria – value and diversification: the 1 percent 
largest exporters in each HS2 Chapter constitutes a single cluster, which we call Group 4. When using 
the  value  criterion,  this  group  accounts  for  63  percent  of all  French  exports.  Group  3  comprises 
exporters in the 95-99 percentiles, accounting for a further 24 percent of exports. Group 2 comprises 
exporters in the 80-95 percentiles and covers 11 percent of the total. The remaining bottom 80% of 
exporters,  which  belongs  to  Group  1,  only  explains  a  residual  3  percent  exports.  The  observed 
concentration is more limited when the criterion of diversification is used: the share of Groups 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 in the total value of French exports are respectively 11 percent, 23 percent, 27 percent and 39 
percent. 
Also,  the  number  of  firms  exporting  by  sector  during  the  year  is  larger  than  the  same  number 
exporting during a specific month. This warning helps interpreting Figure 2 that plots the monthly 
total value of exports by quantile, cumulated over the 96 sectors. Quantiles are here defined in terms 
of  values  of  exports (i.e. value  criterion defined  above).  Export losses appear  to  be concentrated 
among the 1 percent largest exporters (Group 4), rather than on small firms, as one would expect 
owing to their presumed larger sensitivity to contractions in external demand and to credit shortages. 
This  outcome  however  should  not  be  taken  at  face  value,  as  it  primarily  reflects  the  large 
concentration of the value of exports on a tiny proportion of large exporters. The latter, unlike small 10 
 
exporters, do export every month and throughout the entire period of observation, thereby registering 
the highest losses. 
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
The stronger impact of the crisis on exports by the largest exporters is confirmed by plotting year-on-
year changes, calculated as the 12-month rate of change. Using the value criterion to define quantiles, 
we report in Figure 3 evidence showing again that the 1 percent largest exporters of each export sector 
have been the most affected by the crisis. We observe a 31 percent drop in the exports of Group 4 in 
January 2009, against 9 and 11 percent for exporters in Groups 1 and 2 respectively. Interestingly, 
however, from February 2009 onwards, these differences shrink: in April, the losses for firms in 
Group 4 are only twice the size of those borne by firms in Group 1.
7 
-- Figure 3 about here -- 
Given this background, an analysis of the margins of trade becomes necessary to further explore the 
mechanisms at play during the crisis. The purpose of such analysis is to assess what part of the recent 
evolution of trade arose from changes in the volumes of shipments (intensive margin) and what part 
from the contribution of firms-destination specific dynamics of entry and exit (extensive margin). 
 
3- Decomposition of trade margins and contribution of the sectoral dimension 
Different strategies have been adopted in the literature to disentangle the margins of trade, but these 
have been usually computed on annual flows. Calculating the margins of trade on monthly firm-level 
data is more challenging. Not only biases might arise due to problems of seasonality and different 
patterns of working days, but in addition monthly data imply a large turnover of firms and flows: as 
already stressed, not all exporters are exporting each month, and this is even truer for the individual 
products exported to each destination markets. Hence, when using monthly data, it is not possible to 
rely on a decomposition akin to the one based on yearly data. More specifically, it is not possible to 
define and compute the intensive margin as the change in the value of the flows present continuously 
                                                            
7 It is worth noting that losses in the other groups are mechanically cushioned with this method: a firm 
in the top 1 percent facing a drop in its exports may well be downgraded to Group 2 accordingly, and 
thus boost exports for this group. 11 
 
throughout the considered period. Indeed this method would lead to a sharp underestimation of the 
reality. 
Given these constraints we adopt a different method, proposed by Buono et al. (2008) and Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992). This method provides an alternative – and incidentally more precise – assessment 
of the extensive margin: when summing up the margins, it allows to correctly approximating the 
observed aggregate growth rates of exports.
8  It relies on the so-called mid-point growth rate whose 
main advantage over more traditional methods is that it makes it possible to compute growth rates for 
newly created or destroyed flows. Namely, with this method we decompose the year-on-year changes 
to the overall value of French exports into four components: entries, exits, continuing flows with 
positive growth and continuing flows with negative growth. The extensive margin is provided by the 
difference between entry and exit rates and the intensive margin by the difference between positive 
and negative growth rates. The mid-point growth rate is computed on elementary flows defined as in 
Section 1: the monthly export flows by a French firm to a given destination of all CN8 products in a 
same HS2 sector. 
For a firm i exporting a value x to country c and in sector k at month t, the midpoint growth rate is 
defined as: 















Similarly, the weight attributed to each flow is given by the relative share of the flow in total exports 
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Finally, the year-on-year growth rate of the total value of French exports is: 
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Provided that the elementary trade flows in a sector can each month be classified into four subsets 
(created  –  disappeared  –  increased  –  decreased)  Gt  can  simply  be  decomposed  into  the  above 
mentioned four contributions: extensive positive (entry), extensive negative (exit), intensive positive 
(increase in existing flows), intensive negative (reduction in existing flows). 
To further illustrate this method, let us consider the pre-crisis period (2002-2007) and compute the 
corresponding decomposition using yearly data. Table 1 shows the simple averages of contributions. It 
is worth noting that according to our definition a new flow can be a new exporting firm (to a given 
destination in a given sector), or a new destination served by an incumbent exporter. 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
According to the results in Table 1, over the period 2003-2007, the overall increase in the value of 
French exports, estimated at 3.9%, is driven by changes in the intensive margin: increased sales in 
existing flows (firm x destination) alone appears to have recorded a 21.1% yearly increase. Reduced 
sales in existing flows however absorb a large share of these gains, leading to an overall net positive 
contribution of the intensive margin to French export dynamics of 3.2%, i.e. about four fifths (82%) of 
the observed 3.9% yearly increase in exports. The remaining one fifth is contributed by the extensive 
margin, where a slight positive difference between entries and exits emerges. 
Turning to monthly changes we expect more entries and exits than with annual data, as a result of the 
large turnover of elementary flows over months: one particular exporter might export in a given sector 
to a given destination only in February in year t and only March in year t+1. In this case, it will be 
counted as an exit in February t+1 and an entry in March t+1. However, the net contribution of the 
extensive margin should not be much inflated by the use of monthly data. This issue is addressed in 
the  last  row  of  Table  1,  using  the  last  month  of  our  sample  as  example.  The  monthly  gross 
contributions to the extensive margin are 17.4% and -16.5% in December 2007. This is much more 
than the average 6.5% and 5.9% observed over the 2003-2007 period. But the net contributions (0.9% 
in December, 0.6% over 2003-2007) are not too different. 13 
 
We now consider the month of February 2009, which corresponds to the sharpest year-on-year drop in 
French exports in our sample (-27.5%).  Overall 80% of the drop accrues owing to the intensive 
margin, with volumes of individual flows having fallen by 22.7% compared to their level in February 
2009 (see Table 2). In other words, one fifth at most of the observed drop in exports is due to missing 
flows (firm x destination, in a sector). Not surprisingly, firms in all quantile groups record negative 
figures in both the intensive and extensive margins.
9 Nevertheless, the main contributor to the negative 
intensive margin is the group of the 1% largest exporters: for existing flows and on average, 67.4% of 
the value of the February 2009 losses is concentrated in the top 1% firms. Interestingly this figure is 
not so different from the share of exports by this group in total French exports. 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
Having described the method we can now use it to characterise the micro-dynamics of French exports 
during the crisis. We focus on the sub-period running from January 2008 to April 2009. We will 
consider separately the four components of the variations recorded year-on-year. Indeed the different 
components  may  signal  financing  problems  relative  to  specific  aspects  of  the  exporting  activity: 
changes in entry rates may signal problems in financing the fixed sunk costs necessary to enter new 
markets;  changes  in  exit  rates  instead  may  signal  the  impossibility  to  continue  operating  due  to 
difficulties in bridging  cash  flow  gaps  with  external  financing.    Finally,  changes  in the  intensive 
margin can signal changes in demand conditions or a redistribution of market shares. In order to 
correct for seasonal and working-day variations, we apply to the raw data the “cvs-cjo” corrections 
calculated by the French Customs for large aggregates.
10  
The contribution of entry (new firms x destination in a sector) is shown in Figure 4. According to the 
literature  on  finance  and  trade  shortly  referred  in  the  introduction  of  the  paper,  small  and  less 
productive firms, or firms highly dependent on external finance, are expected to suffer the most from 
the drying-up of credit. In contrast, firms benefiting from large collaterals, e.g. firms that being part of 
large groups could either borrow more easily or rely on internal sources of financing, are expected to 
                                                            
9 Quantiles are defined here on the basis of value of exports. 
10 Cf. for instance the French Customs Website (http://www.douane.gouv.fr/)  14 
 
be able to better cushion episodes of credit shortage in the market.
11 This hypothesis however is not 
confirmed by the data on entries: with the exception of a limited decrease in early 2009, we can hardly 
discern any sizeable reduction of entry in Figure 4, suggesting that no major difficulty for financing 
the corresponding fixed costs of market entry has been faced by firms, irrelevant of their size.
12  It is 
worth stressing however that sunk costs are usually paid by a firm well before its entry into a new 
market. Hence the effects of a credit shortage in 2008Q4–2009Q1 are likely to affect only marginally 
firms’ entry strategies over the period of data availability (up to April 2009). Moreover, the mid-point 
growth rates method does not control for the sectoral composition of exports. As the trade crisis 
appears to have affected sectors unevenly, the cross-sectoral evidence reported in Figure 4 may hide 
more severe impacts on specific sectors. We will examine this issue below. 
--Figure 4 about here -- 
Developments in firms’ exits on the other hand may be symptomatic of difficulties in covering the 
export activity, due to costs of fixed or variable nature that cannot be financed with own capital of 
external finance. Problems in financing such costs should lead to exit: either exporters stop exporting 
in a sector, or they reduce the number of destinations they export to and concentrate on their core 
markets as the result of the pecking order of trade referred to above. We examine developments in 
exits since the outbreak of the crisis in Figure 5. It appears that indeed, over the recent period, firms 
have increasingly exited particular export markets, irrelevant of their size. The increase in exits from 
the  exporting  activity  is  ascertained  for  firms  in  the  four  quantile-groups.  It  appears  that  the 
acceleration started in September 2008 for the top 1% firms, but earlier for the 80-95 percentile group, 
possibly reflecting the increases in energy costs and deterioration of global demand that had started in 
the previous months. The contribution of the top 1% exporters is dominant but falls short of the share 
of this group in total French exports. 
--Figure 5 about here -- 
                                                            
11 However being part of a multinational group is not necessarily a good shield when the crisis is 
global and synchronised. 
12 The huge drop of the indicator for the 1% largest exporters in January should not necessarily be 
taken as proof of firms market entry responses to the crisis. 15 
 
Abstracting from firms’ sector and destination market specialisations, we conclude from the previous 
analysis that the contribution of the extensive margin to the decline in French exports is limited (one 
fifth at most). Moreover, it appears to be mostly explained by an increase in exit rates rather than by a 
reduction in entries from exporting markets. All in all, the great bulk of the deterioration in exports 
originated from the intensive margin.  
Hence,  in  Figure  6,  we  illustrate  the  reduction  in  the  intensive  positive  margins.  It  appears  that 
although declining, even during a contraction of the market, a subset of firms increase their exports, 
mirroring the heterogeneity of sectoral developments and the underlying market shares redistributions 
across  competitors.  Hence,  to  the  extent  that  the  crisis  is  associated  with  a  sharpening  of  the 
competitive environment, it represents an opportunity of expansion for top performers at the expenses 
of weaker firms. This is broadly in line with predictions from the literature on firm heterogeneity (e.g. 
Melitz  and  Ottaviano,  2008).  More  interestingly,  the  negative  intensive  margin  (drop  in  sales  in 
markets  where  firms  are  already  present)  very  much  contributes  to  the  observed  drop  in  French 
exports (Figure 7). The largest exporters contribute massively to this reduction in sales that, although 
accelerated from the summer 2008 onwards, had already started as early as January 2008.  
--Figure 6 about here -- 
--Figure 7 about here -- 
In order to illustrate the sectoral composition of such a drop in the sales of the largest firms on their 
existing markets, we aggregate the HS2 Chapters into broad sectors of activity, namely intermediate 
goods, consumption goods, automobile, other transport, other equipment, plus a residual grouping (see 
detail in Appendix 1). The breakdown by broad sector of the contribution by the top 1% French 
exporters’ through the negative intensive margin is shown in Figure 8. More than one third of the 
deterioration is attributable to intermediate goods (-9.6% out of the overall -26.7% in April 2009). 
Other equipment goods and the car industry contribute with –7.2% (i.e about one fourth) and –5.2% 16 
 
(i.e. about one fifth) respectively. In contrast, consumption goods and other transport material
13 play a 
minor role.  
-- Figure 8 about here – 
On  account  of  these  findings,  the  next  step  in  our  analysis  is  to  systematically  disentangle  the 
contributions of sector and destination market from the observed “pure” changes in exports. In order to 
do so, we adapt the shift-share method of analysis to the present framework. This method of analysis 
is an adaptation of the weighted variance analysis (ANOVA) which was initially developed by studies 
in regional economics to give a statistical base to the geographical structural analysis (Jayet, 1993) and 
that  has  been  more  recently  applied  to  international  trade  (Cheptea  et  al.,  2005).  Instead  of 
decomposing a variable’s growth by algebraic means (such as the constant market share analysis in the 
trade field), this method allows to perform econometric estimations at the most granular level of the 
data and to capture thereby estimated parameters associated with e.g. sectoral or geographical fixed 
effects. Results are independent from the order of decomposition, unlike in decompositions based on 
algebraic methods.  
Elementary growth rates (mid-point growth rates in our case) – weighted by means of the variable sikt 
defined above, i.e. export at time t plus export at time t-12 divided by total exports (all firms, sectors 
and destinations) at times t and t-12 – are accordingly regressed (at each period t) on a set of three 
dummies variable: countries, sectors and size-groups. Marginal averages (i.e. marginal impact of a 
given sector or destination or size) are computed from the estimated fixed effects. This is done for the 
same period as above, i.e. January 2008 to April 2009.  
For instance, the mid-point growth rate for the top 1% exporters in April 2009 was equal to –30.2% 
(Table 3). However, large exporters are largely represented in the car industry or may be exporting to 
markets heavily hit by the crisis. The contribution of their geographical composition of exports was    
–0.2% in April and the contribution of the sectoral composition of their exports accounted for another 
–1.1%. Thus, we must correct the apparent mid-point growth rate and subtract these two effects to 
obtain –29.0%. To wrap up, the year-on-year drop recorded for the largest exporters in April 2009 
                                                            
13 This broad sector basically exports aircraft. From year-on-year Airbus does not ship airliners to the 
same countries and the bulk of the changes in exports is captured by the extensive margin. 17 
 
would have been  equal to –29.0%, had their export structure been similar to the cross-destination and 
cross-sector average French exporter at that date. 
-- Table 3 about here – 
The evidence emerging from the shift-share decomposition and the consecutive correction of the mid-
point growth rates leads to qualify our initial conclusion according to which large and small French 
exporters have been hit unevenly by the crisis. At first glance, the uncorrected growth rates in the left 
hand side panel of Table 3 point to a large difference (almost 9 percentage points) between Group 1 
(smallest exporters) and Group 4 (largest exporters): on average in April 2009 the smallest exporters 
recorded only a -21.3% drop in their exports, and the largest exporters a –30.2% drop. The correction 
for the sectoral and, to a lesser extent, the geographical composition of exports however magnifies the 
negative impact of the crisis on the smallest exporters (to -27.1%), suggesting that these latter mostly 
belong to sectors least hit, such as consumption goods, including food, and this cushioned their losses. 
On the contrary, correcting for the geographical and sectoral orientation of exports slightly smoothens 
the mid-point growth rate computed for the largest firms (from -30.2% to -29.0%). 
All in all, controlling for the sectoral specialisation and geographical orientation, in growth rate terms 
there is limited evidence of a differential impact of the crisis on large and small exporters, with one 
notable exception: the month of February 2009, where the largest firms have been the most severely 
hit.  
In conclusion, the sharp concentration of French exports on a limited number of firms explains why 
the largest exporters emerged as the main contributors to the observed drop in exports. However, firms 
of different size have not been affected by the crisis in significantly different ways. If a difference 
must be found between large and small exporters, this concerns the timing of the events: the corrected 
data suggest that the smallest exporters have been hit much earlier (already starting in August 2008) 
than larger firms, whose exports started collapsing only in 2008Q4.  
With all these explanatory elements in hand, we can now perform econometric estimates aiming at 
explaining  the  individual  mid-point  growth  rates  by  quantifying  the  importance  of  sectoral, 
geographical  and  microeconomic  determinants,  including  the  external  finance  dependence  we  are 18 
 
ultimately interested in, and of their interactions. Our conjecture is that if size does not matter, the 
financial dependence may be an important determinant, other things been equal. 
 
4- Determinants of individual export performance 
Our aim is ultimately to disentangle the contribution of various sectoral, geographical and micro-
economic  determinants  of  the  drop  in  individual  French  firm  exports  during  the  crisis,  including 
external finance dependence. We estimate the following equations on the period from 2007M1 to 
2009M4 and by means of weighted OLS:  
e g b a + + + ´ + + = kt ct ikt ikt ckt ickt v u crisis q q import d g log                                  (1) 
e l
g f b a
+ + + ´ ´ +
´ + ´ + + =
kt ct k ikt
k ikt ikt ikt ckt ickt
v u crisis depfi q
depfi q crisis q q import d g
) log(           
) log( log
                     (2) 
where sikt are the weights, computed as above (i.e. export at time t plus export at time t-12 divided by 
total exports (all firms, sectors and destinations) at times t and t-12). We are using growth rates 
computed on values and accordingly combining a change in the volumes as well as prices. 
Our dependent variable, the mid-point growth rate of firms’ exports, is measured at the level of the 
individual firm and is three-dimensional (time, HS2 sector, destination).  
A first determinant of the change in exports is the demand for imports in the sector and destination 
market each firms exports to. We compute this demand as sectoral “net’ imports in each destination 
market, where French exports are subtracted from the total imports of the destination. This procedure 
allows to avoid endogeneity problems. Data provided by the International Trade Centre (ITC) record 
monthly imports up to 2009M4 for a subset of only 52 countries, which however represent about 84% 
of the value of French exports. Given these figures, this variable will control appropriately for the 
well-documented drop in global demand and the extremely skewed sectoral dimension of the crisis. 
Country-and-time and HS2-and-time fixed effects control for any time-varying country determinant, 
including the exchange rate and any sector specific shock. 19 
 
A second determinant to be addressed is the overall impact of the crisis, notwithstanding the demand 
and sectoral issues referred to above. Indeed, the general climate of uncertainty and its impact on 
business confidence, shortage of liquidity and a more restrictive access to the financing of business 
activities in some regions of the world may have exacerbated contraction of both activity and trade, 
beyond demand developments. To control for this we create a variable crisis that is a step-dummy 
taking value 1 from 2008M10 onward. We test the sensitivity of our results by considering 2008M5 
alternatively.  
Thirdly, we must necessarily control for firms’ heterogeneity. A firms’ size is measured by the size of 
its exports relative to the average French exports in the HS2 sector of belonging and it is proxied by a 
set of dummies qikt which indicate the quantile the firm belongs to (as defined above, in exports’ value 
terms
14).   
Beyond  the  classical  determinants  of  export  performances  by  individual  exporters  in  a  setting 
characterised by firm heterogeneity, this paper aims at addressing the impact of financial constraints. 
Hence, a fifth element of our estimation strategy is the financial constraints’ dimension. In designing 
an estimation strategy suitable assessing the role of financial constraints, we must be cautious and 
ensure that we disentangle appropriately the several dimensions of the problem. Firstly, not all sectors 
are affected in the same way by financial constraints. By and large, the production function determines 
the type of financial needs dominant in a sector (See Rajan and Zingales, 1998). On this account, it is 
likely  that  in  good  times  a  well  developed  financial  sector  can  be  the  source  of  a  comparative 
advantage  in  financially  constrained  sectors.  Secondly,  during  the  turmoil,  this  advantage  can  be 
expected to reverse due to credit shortage. To capture this second effect, the financial variables must 
be interacted with a variable which well represents the sequencing of the crisis. Thirdly, heterogeneous 
firms may have uneven access to external finance and thus may be affected differently both by the 
financial dependence of the sector and the cross-effect of the crisis and financial dependence. 
Our investigation of the effect of financial constraints on the dynamics of French firms’ exports uses 
differences across sectors in their dependence on external finance. Rajan and Zingales (1998) use the 
                                                            
14 sikt (share in total exports of sums at time t and t-12 of firm-sector exports’ value) are used to define 
quantiles.  20 
 
capital expenditures minus cash flow over capital expenditures as their main indicator of financial 
dependence. Our source of financial data, Amadeus, does not report capital expenditure, so we rely on 
two alternative measures combining respectively information on two and three ratios.  
As we do not have firm-specific financial information relative to each firm for which we have trade 
data, our financial variables are sectoral averages, at the HS2 level (the HS2 classification categorises 
goods in some 100 different sectors). Hence, we allocate each firm present in Amadeus to its main 
HS2 sector and compute the weighted median of all firms in an HS2 sector. In order to limit the 
impact of outliers, we furthermore class the various elementary  indicators in quintiles. 
Our first composite indicator sums the quintiles a sector belongs to according to two criteria. Cash 
flow over value added proxies for the self-financing capacity of the firm. The ratio of financial charges 
over turnover measures the extent to which firms rely on external financing to finance their activity. 
The composite indicator accordingly ranges from 2 to 10 (depfi2).  
Our second composite indicator, used for robustness analysis, includes a third indicator of financial 
dependence, the ratio of capital employed over fixed assets. We add the quintiles for the three criterion 
to obtain depfi3 ranging from 3 to 15.  
Our indicator of financial dependence is time invariant since it is based on the assumption – standard 
in the literature spearheaded by Rajan and Zingales (1998) – that technological differences across 
sectors determine the need of external finance. As the technological needs of sectors are slow to 
evolve, we can assume their time-invariance over the period of estimation. In the regressions we use 
the log of those indicators. 
An  innovation  of  our  paper  with  respect  to  the  previous  literature  using  indices  of  financial 
dependence  is  that  we  calculate  our  indices  of  financial  dependence  based  on  a  dataset  of  firms 
included in our data-sample (i.e. French firms) and to the data-period under estimation, rather than 
relying  on  the  indices  computed  by  Rajan  and  Zingales  for the  1980s-1990s.  The  table  with the 
resulting index is available in Appendix to the paper. Indeed demand for durable and investment goods 
is volatile over the cycle. Hence external financial dependence could just be correlated to producing 21 
 
investment and durable goods. The inclusion of sector-time fixed effects (on a monthly basis) allows 
us to control for such sectoral volatility over the cycle. 
Finally, in equation (2) we identify the impact of the financial dependence on the mid-point growth 
rate of firms’ exports by interacting our indicator of financial dependence, whose construction has 
been discussed in the previous paragraphs, with the size of firms.  For robustness checking purposes 
we will furthermore replicate these estimations in Section 5 using the alternative method of grouping 
firms within quantiles discussed in Section 2 which is based on firms’ diversification of exports rather 
than exports’ value. 
Two  previously  mentioned  constraints  restrict  the  sample  of  firms  on  which  estimations  are 
performed. First, information on the sectoral demand is not available for all destinations but only for a 
subset of 52 countries. Second, not all HS2 sectors contain a sufficiently large number of firms present 
in Amadeus to be representative enough. We keep the 78 HS2 sectors for which Amadeus reports 
more than 30 firms in 2007. 
We  now  proceed  to  illustrate  the  estimation  results  of  Equation  (1). The  coefficients  reported  in 
column (1) of Table 4 point to the fact that small firms record an export growth slightly lower than the 
group  of  largest  firms,  when  controlling  for  the  demand  addressed  in  the  relevant  sector  and 
destination market (dlimport). This result is robust to the introduction of other controls as shown by 
the results reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.  
In column (2), we report the coefficients for the estimation where the occurrence of the crisis is 
interacted with the size of the exporter relative to the sectoral average. Column (3) reports results 
where the dummy crisis uses October 2008, unlike results in columns (2), where the starting date for 
the crisis was assumed to be May 2008. All in all, results for all the above specification indicate that 
size ultimately did not matter: the differences in estimated parameters are not significant. This result 
confirms  what  we  already  found  through  the  shift-share  approach  that  we  used  to  carry  out  the 
correction of the mid-point growth rates.  22 
 
Summing up, a first conclusion is that differences in the size of exporters do not provide the key 
explanation for the differential impact of the crisis on individual exporters.  
We now turn to a complementary explanation, which is the role of external financial dependence of 
individual  exporters.  We  consider  the  October  2008  starting  date  for  the  crisis.  Two  alternative 
measures of financial dependence are considered.  
Firstly,  in  column  (4)  of  Table  4,  we  regress  the  mid-point  growth  rates  on  external  financial 
dependence, measured by cash flow over value added and financial charges over turnover (ldepfi2) of 
the HS2 sector of main activity of the firm. This term is interacted with the size of the firm. Additional 
explanatory variables used in this specification include the interaction of these two terms with the 
crisis dummy.  
The resulting coefficients clearly indicate firstly that there is no significant difference in the impact of 
the crisis by size quantile, confirming our previous result. Secondly, one hardly finds any difference 
between the impacts of sectoral financial constraints on firms of different size in “normal” times. The 
positive parameters obtained on the four variables interacting of ldepfi2 with q1,..q4 indicate that, 
notwithstanding  differences  in  size,  French  exporters  belonging  to  sectors  extensively  relying  on 
external  finance  have  a  competitive  advantage  and  export  more.  Thirdly,  this  advantage  reverses 
during the crisis: the estimated parameter on the interaction of crisis1 with ldepfi2 and q1,..q4 is 
negative and not significantly different across the different quantiles of size. Similar conclusions, 
though with less statistical significance can be drawn from column (5) relying on a different indicator 
of financial dependence, including additionally the ratio of capital employed over fixed assets (depfi3). 
The estimations are also robust to a change in the starting date assumed for the crisis (May instead of 
October 2008). Results are presented in Appendix to the paper.  
-- Table 4 about here -- 
To sum up our results thus far: 
-  The crisis has impacted firms of different size evenly, when controlling for the sectoral 
dimension of the turmoil. 23 
 
-  Firms  exporting  in  sectors  highly  dependent  on  external  finance  are  structurally 
advantaged in a financially developed country such as France. Other things being equal, 
their export growth is above the average, whatever their individual size. 
-  The crisis has severely hit firms in sectors relying on external finance, irrelevant of firms’ 
size. 
Interestingly, we can compute the effect of the crisis, when the indicator of financial dependence is 
held at its mean, the 10
th and the 90
th percentile. This is done in Table 5, for both depfi2 and depfi3.  
Let  us  firstly  concentrate  on  the  left-hand  side  of  the  Table,  corresponding  to  depfi2.  Before 
commenting these results, it is worth reminding that two different distributions are considered here. 
On the one hand we are interested in the distribution of exporter size within each sector (HS2). We 
have four quantiles of exporters, defined as above using the criterion of total value of exports. On the 
other hand, we have deciles of financial dependence of the sectors themselves. The two financial 
dependence indicators are constructed using individual firm-level data, but they apply in the same 
manner  for  every  exporter  within  a  sector.  We  do  not  introduce  in  the  estimations  individual 
characteristics of exporters in terms of financial dependence. 
Concerning the dynamics of exports for firms belonging to different quantiles, the estimation results 
suggest that the group of smallest exporters faces a slightly lower exports’ growth over the period of 
estimation, but the impact of the crisis is similar across the four quantiles. On the contrary, belonging 
to an HS2 sector ranked in the top decile in terms of financial dependence has a strong negative bias 
on the export performance of the firms, whatever their size. This result contrasts with a negligible 
mean effect on the exporters belonging to the least financially dependent sectors.  
-- Table 5 about here – 
 
Another  potentially  important  determinant  of  exporters’  performance  is  their  specialisation  in 
intermediate goods. Sectors producing goods that are extensively used in intermediate consumption by 
other  sectors  could  have  been  more  impacted  by  the  trade  crisis  (Levchenko  et  al.,  2009).  24 
 
Downstream  linkages  could  have  played  a  role  in  the  transmission  of  the  drop  in  activity,  as 
inventories contraction took place. We use French input-output tables for 2006 provided by Eurostat 
and compute the share of downstream uses (including by itself) of each sector. We allocate each 
individual exporter to its main NACE sector over the period and add this variable of downstream 
linkages and its interaction with the crisis dummy to specification (2) in column (6) and (7) of Table 4. 
Let us stress again, before turning to the result that we capture here a sectoral characteristic observed 
at the level of the NACE classification.
15  
The negative coefficient on the interaction of our indicator of downstream use and the crisis dummy 
indicates  that  exporters  belonging  to  sectors  largely  used  as  intermediate  consumption  have 
underperformed during the crisis.  
Interestingly, this control variable is significant despite the presence of both the sectoral demand on 
the destination market and the time-varying sectoral fixed effect in the regression. This is due to the 
use of two different classifications: individual firm exports are classified according to HS2 headings, 
while each firm is associated with its NACE sector when it comes to measuring the dependence on 
downstream use. The two classifications are not defined at the same degree of detail, and they do not 
match.  The  underlying  rationale  of  the  HS  is  to  classify  traded  products,  while  the  NACE  is  a 
classification in terms of activity. This leads to imperfectly controlling for characteristics of the sectors 
in terms of demand or specific shocks, when the HS is used. All in all, our additional variable may be 
able to better capture the sectoral composition effect associated with the crisis as compared to the ones 
relying on the HS classification. Some sectors of intermediate goods have been severely hit by the 
crisis and the related drying of credit. These same sectors also depend heavily on downstream uses. 
Beyond this debate, what is important to our analysis here is that the inclusion of this additional 
control variable does not change our conclusion regarding firms’ size and financial dependence. 
 
5- Robustness check defining the quantiles in terms of diversification 
                                                            
15  The  industrial  sectors  most  dependent  on  downstream  uses  are  `Other  mining  and  quarrying 
products’, `Wood and products of wood ’, `Other non-metallic mineral products’ and `Fabricated 
metal products, except machinery and equipment’. 25 
 
We have so far relied on quantiles defined on the basis of the relative value of individual firms exports 
within  a  HS2  sector.  Accordingly,  contributions  to  the  mid-point  growth  rates  calculated  are 
dependent from this assumption. Also, even if in section 4 we address the growth (and not the level) of 
individual exports, our results might be sensitive to the allocation of our exporters across quantiles. In 
order to control for the sensitivity of results to the allocation of firms to given quantiles, we rerun the 
estimations  of  section  4  using  the  alternative  criterion  of  definition  for  the  quantiles  previously 
discussed, i.e the diversification of individual exports, calculated as the number of elementary markets 
(CN8 positions x destination countries) per French firm within a HS2 sector. The 1 percent most 
diversified exporters in each HS2 Chapter constitutes a single cluster, which we call Group 4. Group 3 
comprises exporters in the 95-99 percentiles. Group 2 comprises exporters in the 80-95 percentiles. 
The remaining bottom 80% exporters belong to Group 1.  
We firstly replicate our decomposition of export growth over the period 2008M1 to 2009M4 in a 
positive extensive margin (entry), a negative extensive margin (exit), a positive intensive margin and a 
negative intensive margin. Results are shown in Figure 9 (to be compared with Figure 4) for entry, in 
Figure 10 (resp. 5) for exit, in Figure 11 (resp. 6) for the positive intensive margin and in Figure 12 
(resp. 7) for the negative intensive margin. 
Two main results can be drawn from the comparison of these figures. Firstly, as expected, there is 
much change for entry and exit. Using the criterion of value to rank the firms, the largest firms had the 
largest positive contribution to entry. This result is now reversed: the one percent most diversified 
firms contribute only marginally: we do face champions in their own export niche, hardly changing 
their  strategy  during  the  turmoil.  On  the  contrary,  the  least  diversified  firms,  exhibiting  limited 
duration  of  their  exports  on  their  elementary  markets,  contribute  largely..  The  same  explanation 
pertains to the contribution of exits. The less diversified firms contribute the most to exits, while the 
most diversified contribute only marginally. The latter keep their portfolio of markets rather constant 
and ultimately contribute at most to their weight in the total value of exports. 
The second key observation is that the positive and negative intensive margins are much less affected 
by our change of metric. The largest firms in value, as well as the most diversified are the main 26 
 
contributors. The only difference is that the contribution of the first percentile is reduced, while the 
contribution  of  the  last  percentile  is  increased.  What  we  see  now  is  that  diversified  large  firms, 
exporting many products to many markets face a plummeting of their sales on all markets similar to 
the one faced by firms exporting large values. Their negative contribution is still 17% at the end of the 
period considered, to be compared with 25% with the criterion of value.  
All in all, given the overwhelming contribution of the intensive margin to the total change in French 
exports, our conclusions are fairly robust: the large and diversified exporters account for most of the 
drop in French exports during the turmoil. 
-- Figure 9 about here -- 
-- Figure 10 about here -- 
-- Figure 11 about here -- 
-- Figure 12 about here -- 
The  next  robustness  check  is  to  perform  the  shift  share  correction  using  this  new  criterion  of 
diversification. Results are given in Table 6, to be compared with Table 3. As in the estimations with 
quantiles defined in terms of export value, the uncorrected growth rates in the left hand side panel of 
Table 6 point to a large difference between the Group 1 (here the least diversified exporters) and 
Group 4 (the most diversified exporters): on average in April 2009 the least diversified exporters have 
recorded a –26.2% drop in their exports, and the most diversified exporters a –32.4% drop. Also as 
with  the  definition  of  quantiles  in  terms  of  export  value,  the  correction  for  the  sectoral  and 
geographical composition of exports magnifies the negative impact of the crisis on the least diversified 
exporters (-28.4%). On the contrary, correcting for the geographical and sectoral orientation of exports 
smoothes the mid-point growth rate computed for the most diversified exporters (-29.9%). Overall, our 
conclusions  are  robust  to  this  change  of  criterion  of  classification  of  firms  and  there  is  limited 
evidence of a differential impact of the crisis on well diversified and poorly diversified exporters when 
one controls for the orientation of their exports.  
-- Table 6 about here – 27 
 
The  last  step  of  our robustness check  consists in replicating  our econometric  estimates  using  the 
definition of quantiles of exporters in terms of export diversification. Results are shown in Table 7. In 
column (2) we observe that the lower performance in terms of export growth no longer affects the 
quantile  of  the  smallest  firms,  but  now  the  two  quantiles  of  the  least  diversified  ones.  More 
importantly, here again, there is hardly a significant difference in terms of impact of the crisis on the 
four quantiles of exporters. If a difference is to be captured, it is beneficial to the least diversified 
exporters. The latter result is in line with the explanation referred to above: some large and resilient 
exporters may be little diversified. These results are confirmed in column (3) when the starting point 
of  the  crisis  is  supposed  to  be  October  2008.    In  column  (4),  we  introduce  ldepfi2.  Results  are 
qualitatively similar to the ones presented in Table 4.  Exporting in a financially constrained sector 
provides  in  general  a  competitive  advantage  in  normal  times,  whatever  the  diversification  of  the 
exporters. As regards the magnitude of such effect, a difference must be made with the previous 
estimations based on the criterion of export value. We observe here that the impact is increasing in the 
diversification  of  exports.  On  the  contrary,  during  a  credit  crisis,  this  becomes  an  obstacle  for 
exporters, and this evenly hits their exports whatever their diversification. All in all, our results are 
robust to a change in the criterion for ranking: export value versus export diversification. 
However,  we  identify  a  problem  of  multicolinearity  when  ldepfi3  is  used  instead  of  ldepfi2,  as 
reported in column (5). The model is neither able to identify the parameter associated with the ldepfi3 
variable of financial dependence, nor able to identify the parameter on the interaction between the 
occurrence of the crisis and the quantile of exporters. This outcome is due to the peculiar nature of our 
exercise: we have time×sector fixed effects and a very limited variance between quantiles given their 
greater homogeneity, compared to the previous exercise whereby they were defined in export value 
terms.  This  result  suggests  that  we  should  use  information  on  the  financial  dependence  of  the 
individual firms, rather than of the sectors they belong to. To do so, we need detailed information on 
the financial dependence of each exporter, which is far beyond the exercise conducted here on the 
basis of the financial data provided by Amadeus. This will be the objective of a future research, 




Beyond a limited resurgence of protectionism, two broad explanations of the collapse of world trade 
have been suggested. Firstly the fall in activity has been global, and has particularly hit investment 
goods and automobile industries. The international fragmentation of supply chains may have further 
magnified changes in industrial production. Secondly, dried trade finance may have hit exporters. 
Beyond trade finance, credit attrition may have affected particularly strongly sectors relying heavily 
on external finance, in line with the seminal argument of Rajan and Zingales (1998). Such dependence 
of the sectoral export performance on external finance has been addressed in this paper using firm-
level data for French exporters throughout the crisis.  
Our results point to limited differences in the growth of exports among large and small exporters when 
the  sectoral  and  geographical  composition  of  exports  is  controlled.  The  econometric  analysis 
nevertheless points to a differential impact of financial dependence: the highest the dependence on 
external finance of a sector, the worst French exporters operating in that sector have been affected by 
the crisis. 
These results are robust to a change of the definition of the quantiles of exporters, whereby the value 
of exports is replaced by their diversification. There are also robust to the introduction of downward 
linkages whereby exporters belonging to sectors largely used in intermediate consumption have been 
more severely hit by the crisis. 
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Tables and Figures 
 




Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. 3-months moving averages. Left scale: euros. 
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Figure 2: Total value of French exports by quantile of exporters, 2000-M0 to 2009-M4 
 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. 3-months moving averages. Exporters are ranked according to 
the value of their exports within a sector. Group 1 comprises exporters in the 0-79 percentiles, group 2 exporters 
in the 80-94 percentiles, group 3 in the 95-99 percentiles. Group 4 comprises the 1 percent largest exporters. 




















































Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports 
within a sector. Group 1 comprises exporters in the 0-79 percentiles, group 2 exporters in the 80-94 percentiles, 
group 3 in the 95-99 percentiles. Group 4 comprises the 1 percent largest exporters. 






































































































Figure 4: Contribution of entry to mid-point growth rates 2008-M1 to 2009-M4  
 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports 
within a sector. 



















Figure 5: Contribution of exit to mid-point growth rates 2008-M1 to 2009-M4  
 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports 
within a sector. 


















Figure 6: Contribution of positive growth to mid-point growth rates 2008-M1 to 2009-M4  
 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports 
within a sector. 


















Figure 7: Contribution of negative growth to mid-point growth rates 2008-M1 to 2009-M4 –  
 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports 
within a sector. 















Figure 8: Contribution of negative growth to the top 1% exporters sales’ mid-point growth rates 
2008-M1 to 2009-M4, by broad sector  
 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports 
within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 
 
 







































Figure 9: Contribution of entry to mid-point growth rates 2008-M1 to 2009-M4  
 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the diversification of their 
exports within a sector. 



















Figure 10: Contribution of exit to mid-point growth rates 2008-M1 to 2009-M4  
 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the diversification of their 
exports within a sector. 


















Figure 11: Contribution of positive growth to mid-point growth rates 2008-M1 to 2009-M4  
 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the diversification of their 
exports within a sector. 















Figure 12: Contribution of negative growth to mid-point growth rates 2008-M1 to 2009-M4 –  
 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the diversification of their 
exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 
 



















Table 1: Contributions to mid-point growth rates, 2002-2007, French exports (percent) 
 







Growth > 0 
(4) 





Bottom 80% exporters  0.6  -0.5  0.0  0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0 
80-95%  1.2  -1.1  0.1  1.4  -1.4  0.0  0.1 
95-99%  1.7  -1.5  0.2  4.0  -3.6  0.4  0.6 
Top 1% exporters  3.0  -2.7  0.3  15.5  -12.7  2.8  3.1 
All  6.5  -5.9  0.6  21.1  -17.9  3.2  3.9 
All (december 2007)  17.4  -16.5  0.9  24.9  -21.1  3.7  4.6 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Simple averages of contributions calculated for each year, 
with the exception of last row. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 
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Table 2: Contributions to mid-point growth rates, February 2009, French exports (percent) 
 







Growth > 0 
(4) 





Bottom 80% exporters  1.5  -2.0  -0.5  0.4  -0.6  -0.2  -0.6 
80-95%  3.0  -4.1  -1.1  2.0  -3.5  -1.6  -2.7 
95-99%  4.0  -5.7  -1.8  4.3  -8.8  -4.5  -6.3 
Top 1% exporters  5.3  -6.9  -1.6  10.1  -26.5  -16.4  -18.0 
All  13.8  -18.7  -4.9  16.7  -39.3  -22.7  -27.5 
 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports 
within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations45 
 
Table 3: Mid-point growth rate of exports (year-on-year) by group of exporter before and after 
correction for export composition (sectoral and geographical) 
 
 
  Before correction    After correction 
Group  1  2  3  4    1  2  3  4 
2008-01  5.1  8.5  7.2  11.5    7.8  10.2  7.9  10.8 
2008-02  4.7  10.2  11.4  11.6    2.4  9.3  10.5  12.2 
2008-03  -4.1  3.4  5.0  4.8    -1.8  4.9  5.6  4.2 
2008-04  2.9  4.8  6.2  3.8    2.3  3.7  4.5  4.6 
2008-05  -2.9  -0.1  5.3  0.6    -3.2  -0.2  4.5  0.9 
2008-06  -4.9  1.4  7.6  6.5    -3.3  1.7  7.2  6.5 
2008-07  0.6  1.3  2.9  6.7    2.6  3.0  3.0  6.3 
2008-08  -7.4  -1.4  2.0  1.6    -7.2  -1.3  1.1  1.9 
2008-09  -2.6  0.7  -0.4  2.9    -3.1  -0.3  -1.4  3.4 
2008-10  -7.0  -2.6  -4.5  -5.8    -9.5  -5.0  -6.0  -4.8 
2008-11  -13.5  -8.8  -10.7  -5.4    -14.1  -9.3  -10.9  -5.2 
2008-12  -11.1  -11.5  -17.9  -9.0    -9.9  -10.4  -14.8  -10.4 
2009-01  -20.1  -20.5  -23.2  -30.2    -26.2  -25.9  -25.4  -28.1 
2009-02  -21.6  -24.3  -26.1  -28.9    -22.6  -26.1  -26.8  -28.3 
2009-03  -16.6  -19.8  -21.1  -26.5    -23.8  -25.7  -23.6  -24.2 
2009-04  -21.3  -23.1  -26.2  -30.2    -27.1  -27.4  -26.9  -29.0 
Note: Group 1 comprises exporters in the 0-80 percentiles, group 2 exporters in the 80-95 percentiles, group 3 in 
the 95-99 percentiles. Group 4 comprises the 1 percent largest exporters. Exporters are ranked according to the 
value of their exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 46 
 
Table 4: Dependent variable year-on-year mid-point growth rate of monthly exports for 
individual firms (2007M1-2009M4) 
Parameter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Intercept  -0.226***  0.001  0.002  -0.195***  -0.247***  -0.513***  -0.588*** 
  (-41.29)  (0.19)  (0.30)  (-3.19)  (-3.25)  (-3.50)  (-3.57) 
dlimport  0.289***  0.289***  0.289***  0.289***  0.289***  0.289***  0.289*** 
  (214.64)  (214.68)  (214.59)  (214.56)  (214.58)  (215.95)  (216.00) 
q1 (smallest exporters)  -0.027***  -0.017***  -0.028***  -0.041***  -0.030***  0.017  0.068*** 
  (-14.50)  (-6.86)  (-12.71)  (-5.96)  (-3.52)  (1.33)  (3.53) 
q2  0.005***  0.018***  0.009***  -0.024***  -0.027***  -0.020***  0.004 
  (5.28)  (13.32)  (7.60)  (-6.67)  (-5.63)  (-2.95)  (0.38) 
q3  0.015***  0.028***  0.024***  -0.010***  0.009***  0.018***  0.096*** 
  (21.59)  (29.59)  (28.13)  (-3.91)  (2.71)  (3.88)  (12.30) 
q4 (largest exporters)               
  .  .  .  .    .  . 
crisis*q1    -0.246***           
    (-29.16)           
crisis*q2    -0.250***           
    (-32.14)           
crisis*q3    -0.251***           
    (-32.72)           
crisis*q4    -0.221***           
    (-29.14)           
crisis1*q1      -0.219***  0.560***  0.742***  1.626***  1.845*** 
      (-24.98)  (6.43)  (6.84)  (7.83)  (7.86) 
crisis1*q2    -0.235***  0.533***  0.741***  1.630***  1.905*** 
      (-29.33)  (6.17)  (6.89)  (7.89)  (8.18) 
crisis1*q3    -0.251***  0.533***  0.700***  1.610***  1.776*** 
      (-31.96)  (6.18)  (6.52)  (7.80)  (7.64) 
crisis1*q4    -0.222***  0.512***  0.692***  1.574***  1.800*** 
      (-28.48)  (5.94)  (6.45)  (7.63)  (7.75) 
Continued….               
 
Note: Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports within a sector.   
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Parameter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
ldepfi2*q 1        0.151***    0.334***   
        (3.40)    (3.14)   
ldepfi2*q 2        0.162***    0.366***   
        (3.65)    (3.45)   
ldepfi2*q 3        0.162***    0.350***   
        (3.66)    (3.30)   
ldepfi2*q 4        0.144***    0.350***   
        (3.25)    (3.30)   
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 1        -0.556***    -1.321***   
        (-8.85)    (-8.81)   
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 2        -0.551***    -1.322***   
        (-8.80)    (-8.84)   
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 3        -0.560***    -1.317***   
        (-8.95)    (-8.81)   
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 4        -0.532***    -1.282***   
        (-8.51)    (-8.58)   
ldepfi3*q 1          0.084***    0.218*** 
          (3.26)    (2.89) 
ldepfi3*q 2          0.095***    0.256*** 
          (3.71)    (3.40) 
ldepfi3*q 3          0.088***    0.219*** 
          (3.43)    (2.91) 
ldepfi3*q 4          0.083***    0.255*** 
          (3.25)    (3.39) 
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 1          -0.321***    -0.937*** 
          (-8.82)    (-8.74) 
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 2          -0.326***    -0.963*** 
          (-9.03)    (-9.06) 
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 3          -0.317***    -0.909*** 
          (-8.81)    (-8.57) 
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 4          -0.305***    -0.910*** 
          (-8.48)    (-8.58) 
Downstream use (DU)            0.122***  0.121*** 
            (39.66)  (39.11) 
crisis1*DU            -0.100***  -0.101*** 
            (-17.29)  (-17.32) 
n  10 771 590  10 771 590 10 771 590  10 771 590  10 771 590  10691692  10691692 
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 Table 5: Mean effects by quantile of firm size and by quantile of financial dependence of HS2 sectors 
 
  depfi2  depfi3 
  Mean effect  Effect 10
th perc. of 
sectors 
Effect 90
th perc. of 
sectors 






q 1  -0.027  -0.033  -0.021  -0.028  -0.029  -0.027 
q 2  0.011  -0.004  0.026  0.010  -0.002  0.022 
q 3  0.026  0.010  0.041  0.024  0.019  0.029 
q 4             
crisis1*q 1  -0.559  -0.085  -1.004  -0.269  0.046  -0.598 
crisis1*q 2  -0.537  -0.077  -0.969  -0.248  0.062  -0.571 
crisis1*q 3  -0.539  -0.072  -0.979  -0.249  0.059  -0.571 
crisis1*q 4  -0.532  -0.073  -0.963  -0.243  0.058  -0.557 
 
Note: Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports within a sector. Computed from specification 





Table 6: Mid-point growth rate of exports (year-on-year) by group of exporter before and after 
correction for export composition (sectoral and geographical) 
 
 
  Before correction    After correction 
Group  1#  2#  3#  4#    1#  2#  3#  4# 
2008-01  12.1  12.2  10.3  7.9    11.5  11.1  10.5  8.6 
2008-02  17.7  13.5  8.7  10.0    13.3  11.9  10.8  10.5 
2008-03  9.6  7.2  5.1  0.8    0.4  6.5  6.2  3.2 
2008-04  -1.6  11.0  1.8  4.6    5.8  8.7  1.3  4.1 
2008-05  6.5  9.7  -4.3  -0.4    5.5  7.1  -1.6  -0.6 
2008-06  10.0  10.9  7.5  0.7    9.7  8.7  6.3  2.9 
2008-07  6.3  11.2  4.0  1.8    5.8  9.9  2.3  3.9 
2008-08  3.4  6.7  -1.8  -0.9    1.5  4.8  -1.8  0.9 
2008-09  4.1  6.8  -2.1  1.1    2.7  2.8  0.5  1.8 
2008-10  -1.8  -5.0  -2.3  -8.3    -4.9  -7.7  -1.6  -6.4 
2008-11  6.0  -8.9  -5.1  -12.3    1.5  -10.5  -8.6  -7.0 
2008-12  5.6  -17.1  -1.0  -21.7    -8.2  -13.3  -6.3  -15.4 
2009-01  -19.4  -27.3  -22.6  -33.0    -26.2  -28.1  -22.9  -30.2 
2009-02  -20.6  -27.8  -22.7  -33.2    -27.8  -27.4  -25.6  -29.0 
2009-03  -25.8  -23.2  -20.1  -27.5    -21.8  -25.2  -21.7  -26.2 
2009-04  -26.2  -30.6  -21.9  -32.4    -28.4  -30.8  -24.1  -29.9 
Note: Group 1 comprises exporters in the 0-80 percentiles, group 2 exporters in the 80-95 percentiles, group 3 in 
the 95-99 percentiles. Group 4 comprises the 1 percent largest exporters. Exporters are ranked according to the 
diversification of their exports within a sector. 




Table 7: Dependent variable year-on-year mid-point growth rate of monthly exports for 
individual firms (2007M1-2009M4) 
Parameter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept    0.011**  0.009*  -0.648***  -0.740*** 
    (2.14)  (1.70)  (-4.38)  (-4.45) 
dlimport    0.289***  0.290***  0.289***  0.289*** 
    (214.85)  (215.42)  (214.76)  (215.00) 
q1 # (least diversified)    -0.090***  -0.067***  0.301***  0.537*** 
    (-65.6)  (-54.47)  (41.57)  (46.86) 
q2#    -0.013***  0.002**  0.285***  0.219*** 
    (-12.1)  (2.33)  (52.19)  (24.3) 
q3#    0.020***  0.015***  0.191***  0.242*** 
    (20.21)  (16.62)  (37.78)  (29.52) 
q4 # (most diversified)           
    .  .  .  . 
crisis*q1#    -0.118***       
    (-15.12)       
crisis*q2#    -0.212***       
    (-27.68)       
crisis*q3#    -0.242***       
    (-31.62)       
crisis*q4#    -0.250***       
    (-32.86)       
crisis1*q1#      -0.134***  1.679***  ns 
      (-16.64)  (8.06)   
crisis1*q2#    -0.245***  1.694***  ns 
      (-31.16)  (8.14)   
crisis1*q3#    -0.218***  1.516***  ns 
      (-27.75)  (7.28)   
crisis1*q4#    -0.250***  1.563***  ns 
      (-31.93)  (7.51)   
Continued….           
 
Note: Exporters are ranked according to the diversification of their exports within a sector.   
   51 
 
Parameter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
ldepfi2*q 1        0.234***   
        (2.19)   
ldepfi2*q 2        0.284**   
        (2.65)   
ldepfi2*q 3        0.349**   
        (3.26)   
ldepfi2*q 4        0.454***   
        (4.25)   
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 1#        -1.306***   
        (-8.66)   
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 2#        -1.384***   
        (-9.19)   
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 3#        -1.260***   
        (-8.37)   
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 4#        -1.306***   
        (-8.67)   
ldepfi3*q 1#          0.065 
          0.85 
ldepfi3*q 2#          0.242** 
          3.19 
ldepfi3*q 3#          0.237 
          3.12** 
ldepfi3*q 4#          0.341 
          4.49*** 
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 1#          ns 
           
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 2#          ns 
           
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 3#          ns 
           
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 4#          ns 
           
n  10 771 590  10 771 590  10 771 590  10 771 590  10 771 590 
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Appendix 1: Classification of HS2 groups in broad sectors 
 
Broad sector HS2 Content Broad sector HS2 Content Broad sector HS2 Content
interm 1 Live animals interm 68 Stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica, etc articles cons 19 Cereal, flour, starch, milk preparations and products
interm 5 Products of animal origin, nes interm 70 Glass and glassware cons 20 Vegetable, fruit, nut, etc food preparations
interm 10 Cereals interm 72 Iron and steel cons 21 Miscellaneous edible preparations
interm 11 Milling products, malt, starches, inulin, wheat gluten interm 73 Articles of iron or steel cons 22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar
interm 13 Lac, gums, resins, vegetable saps and extracts nes interm 74 Copper and articles thereof cons 24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes
interm 14 Vegetable plaiting materials, vegetable products nes interm 75 Nickel and articles thereof cons 30 Pharmaceutical products
interm 15 Animal,vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc interm 76 Aluminium and articles thereof cons 33 Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toileteries
interm 23 Residues, wastes of food industry, animal fodder interm 78 Lead and articles thereof cons 37 Photographic or cinematographic goods
interm 25 Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cement interm 79 Zinc and articles thereof cons 42 Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel goods
interm 26 Ores, slag and ash interm 80 Tin and articles thereof cons 43 Furskins and artificial fur, manufactures thereof
interm 27 Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc interm 81 Other base metals, cermets, articles thereof cons 46 Manufactures of plaiting material, basketwork, etc.
interm 28 Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotopes autom 87 Vehicles other than railway, tramway cons 49 Printed books, newspapers, pictures etc
interm 29 Organic chemicals other transp 86 Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, equipment cons 57 Carpets and other textile floor coverings
interm 31 Fertilizers other transp 88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof cons 58 Special woven or tufted fabric, lace, tapestry etc
interm 32 Tanning, dyeing extracts, tannins, derivs,pigments etc other transp 89 Ships, boats and other floating structures cons 59 Impregnated, coated or laminated textile fabric
interm 34 Soaps, lubricants, waxes, candles, modelling pastes other eqt 82 Tools, implements, cutlery, etc of base metal cons 60 Knitted or crocheted fabric
interm 35 Albuminoids, modified starches, glues, enzymes other eqt 84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc cons 61 Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet
interm 36 Explosives, pyrotechnics, matches, pyrophorics, etc other eqt 85 Electrical, electronic equipment cons 62 Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet
interm 38 Miscellaneous chemical products other eqt 90 Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc apparatus cons 63 Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing etc
interm 39 Plastics and articles thereof other eqt 93 Arms and ammunition, parts and accessories thereof cons 64 Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof
interm 40 Rubber and articles thereof other eqt 94 Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated buildings cons 65 Headgear and parts thereof
interm 41 Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather cons 2 Meat and edible meat offal cons 69 Ceramic products
interm 44 W ood and articles of wood, wood charcoal cons 3 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic invertebrates nes cons 91 Clocks and watches and parts thereof
interm 45 Cork and articles of cork cons 4 Dairy products, eggs, honey, edible animal product nes cons 92 Musical instruments, parts and accessories
interm 47 Pulp of wood, fibrous cellulosic material, waste etc cons 6 Live trees, plants, bulbs, roots, cut flowers etc cons 95 Toys, games, sports requisites
interm 48 Paper & paperboard, articles of pulp, paper and board cons 7 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers misc 66 Umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, etc
interm 50 Silk cons 8 Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons misc 67 Bird skin, feathers, artificial flowers, human hair
interm 51 W ool, animal hair, horsehair yarn and fabric thereof cons 9 Coffee, tea, mate and spices misc 71 Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc
interm 52 Cotton cons 12 Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruit, etc, nes misc 83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal
interm 53 Vegetable textile fibres nes, paper yarn, woven fabric cons 16 Meat, fish and seafood food preparations nes misc 96 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
interm 54 Manmade filaments cons 17 Sugars and sugar confectionery misc 97 W orks of art, collectors pieces and antiques
interm 55 Manmade staple fibres cons 18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations
interm 56 W adding, felt, nonwovens, yarns, twine, cordage, etc53 
 
Appendix 2: Classification of sector by financial dependence 
 
hs2 depfi2 depfi3
Works of art, collectors` 
pieces and antiques.
97 2 3
Coffee, tea, mat– and 
spices.
9 2 3
Oil seed, oleagi fruits. 






Cocoa and cocoa 
preparations.
18 3 4
Animal/veg fats & oils & 
their cleavage products. 
etc
15 3 5






Essential oils & resinoids. 
perf, cosmetic/toilet prep
33 3 7
Headgear and parts 
thereof.
65 3 7
Edible fruit and nuts. peel 
of citrus fruit or melons.
8 3 8








Prep of vegetable, fruit, 
nuts or other parts of 
plants
20 4 5
Fish & crustacean, mollusc 
& other aquatic 
invertebrate
3 4 6
Dairy prod. birds` eggs. 
natural honey. edible prod 
nes
4 4 7
Miscellaneous articles of 
base metal.
83 4 7
Salt. sulphur. earth & ston. 





Mineral fuels, oils & 
product of their 
distillation.etc
27 4 9
Machinery & mech 







rolling-stock & parts 
thereof. etc
86 4 9
Live animals. 1 5 6
Lac. gums, resins & other 
vegetable saps & extracts.
13 5 6
Meat and edible meat 
offal.
2 5 7
Vehicles o/t railw/tramw 




active agents, washing 
prep, etc
34 5 7








newspapers, pictures & 
other product etc
49 5 8
Wood and articles of 
wood. wood charcoal.
44 5 8
Sugars and sugar 
confectionery.
17 5 9
Ships, boats and floating 
structures.
89 5 9
Other vegetable textile 
fibres. paper yarn & woven 
fab
53 5 9
Fertilisers. 31 5 10
Wadding, felt & nonwoven. 
yarns. twine, cordage, etc
56 6 8
Articles of iron or steel. 73 6 9
Organic chemicals. 29 6 9
Tool, implement, cutlery, 
spoon & fork, of base met 
etc
82 6 9





Iron and steel. 72 6 10
Musical instruments. parts 
and access of such 
articles
92 6 11
Copper and articles 
thereof.
74 6 11
Inorgn chem. compds of 








modified starches. glues. 
enzymes.
35 7 8
Prod mill indust. malt. 
starches. inulin. wheat 
gluten
11 7 9




Edible vegetables and 
certain roots and tubers.
7 7 9
Knitted or crocheted 
fabrics.
60 7 9
Raw hides and skins 
(other than furskins) and 
leather.
41 7 11





mattress, matt support, 
cushion etc
94 7 11
Electrical mchy equip 
parts thereof. sound 
recorder etc
85 7 12
Aluminium and articles 
thereof.
76 8 9
Residues & waste from the 
food indust. prepr ani 
fodder
23 8 9
Man-made filaments. 54 8 10
Cotton. 52 8 10
Live tree & other plant. 
bulb, root. cut flowers etc
6 8 10




Art of apparel & clothing 




tannins & derivs. pigm etc
32 8 11







Cereals. 10 8 12
Toys, games & sports 
requisites. parts & 
access thereof
95 8 12
Other made up textile 
articles. sets. worn 
clothing etc
63 8 12
Special woven fab. tufted 
tex fab. lace. tapestries etc
58 8 12
Ceramic products. 69 8 12
Carpets and other textile 
floor coverings.
57 9 10
Clocks and watches and 
parts thereof.
91 9 12
Glass and glassware. 70 9 14
Footwear, gaiters and the 
like. parts of such articles.
64 9 14
Wool, fine/coarse animal 
hair, horsehair yarn & 
fabric
51 10 12
Man-made staple fibres. 55 10 12
Products of animal origin, 
nes or included.
5 10 14
Aircraft, spacecraft, and 
parts thereof.
88 10 15
Depfi 2 and depfi 3 are composite indicators that take into account two and three financial criteria (cash-flow 
over value-added, financial charges over turnover and capital employed over fixed assets) to assess the 
degree of external financial dependance  55 
 
Appendix 3 Estimation results controlling for financial dependence (breakpoint: May 2008)   
 
  (1)  (2) 
Intercept  -0.091  -0.119 
  (-1.54)  (-1.61) 
dlimport  0.289***  0.289*** 
  (214.63)  (214.66) 
q 1  -0.026***  -0.017 
  (-3.37)  (-1.78) 
q 2  -0.006  -0.009* 
  (-1.59)  (-1.74) 
q 3  -0.005*  0.015*** 
  (-1.85)  (4.01) 
q 4  0.000  0.000 
  .  . 
crisis*q 1  0.409***  0.571*** 
  (4.78)  (5.37) 
crisis*q 2  0.386***  0.561*** 
  (4.54)  (5.30) 
crisis*q 3  0.416***  0.560*** 
  (4.90)  (5.29) 
crisis*q 4  0.413***  0.569*** 
  (4.87)  (5.39) 
Continued…     
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Appendix 3 (cont.) 
 
  (1)  (2) 
ldepfi2*q 1  0.073*   
  (1.70)   
ldepfi2*q 2  0.081*   
  (1.89)   
ldepfi2*q 3  0.086***   
  (2.01)   
ldepfi2*q 4  0.068   
  (1.59)   
crisis*ldepfi2*q 1  -0.470***   
  (-7.60)   
crisis*ldepfi2*q 2  -0.460***   
  (-7.47)   
crisis*ldepfi2*q 3  -0.477***   
  (-7.75)   
crisis*ldepfi2*q 4  -0.459***   
  (-7.46)   
ldepfi3*q 1    0.040 
    (1.60) 
ldepfi3*q 2    0.049** 
    (1.97) 
ldepfi3*q 3    0.044* 
    (1.78) 
ldepfi3*q 4    0.040 
    (1.62) 
crisis*ldepfi3*q 1    -0.273*** 
    (-7.64) 
crisis*ldepfi3*q 2    -0.271*** 
    (-7.63) 
crisis*ldepfi3*q 3    -0.270*** 
    (-7.63) 
crisis*ldepfi3*q 4    -0.264*** 
    (-7.45) 
n  10 771 590  10 771 590 
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